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ABSTRACT
To bring their innovative ideas to market, those embarking in new
ventures have to raise money, and, to do so, they have often re-
sorted to banks and venture capitalists. Nowadays, they have an
additional option: that of crowdfunding. The name refers to the
idea that funds come from a network of people on the Internet who
are passionate about supporting others’ projects. One of the most
popular crowdfunding sites is Kickstarter. In it, creators post de-
scriptions of their projects and advertise them on social media sites
(mainly Twitter), while investors look for projects to support. The
most common reason for project failure is the inability of founders
to connect with a sufficient number of investors, and that is mainly
because hitherto there has not been any automatic way of matching
creators and investors. We thus set out to propose different ways of
recommending investors found on Twitter for specific Kickstarter
projects. We do so by conducting hypothesis-driven analyses of
pledging behavior and translate the corresponding findings into dif-
ferent recommendation strategies. The best strategy achieves, on
average, 84% of accuracy in predicting a list of potential investors’
Twitter accounts for any given project. Our findings also produced
key insights about the whys and wherefores of investors deciding
to support innovative efforts.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and behavioral sciences
Keywords
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1. INTRODUCTION
Kickstarter is a crowdfunding website where a founder proposes a
project (e.g., smart watch, documentary, video game) and asks the
Internet crowd for money. Its use has been growing exponentially:
“The amount pledged on Kickstarter alone grew from $28m in 2010
to $320m in 2012” [7].
However, not all projects are successfully financed. One of the
most common reasons for failure is that project founders fail to
build a community around them and attract investors. A recent
study has indeed found that “the majority of failed project creators
cited the inability to successfully leverage an online audience as a
main reason for failing.” [14]. That is why we set out to propose
automatic ways of matching Kickstarter founders with Twitter in-
vestors. In so doing, we make the following main contributions:
∗This work was conducted when the author was in University of
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Figure 1: Aspects hypothesized to affect pledging behavior. We
have three actors: (frequent vs. occasional) investors, a founder
(with specific project management skills), and the project itself.
• We derive a set of well-grounded hypotheses related to pledg-
ing behavior (Section 3).
• We crawl data from Kickstarter, including detailed project
descriptions and lists of investors, for a period of 3 months
(Section 4). Also, since we need to recommend investors
from Twitter, we gather all the tweets related to the projects
we previously crawled.
• Upon those two datasets, we test a set of of the hypothe-
ses (Section 5). We find that investors behave differently
depending on whether they are frequent or occasional sup-
porters on the site. As opposed to occasional investors (51%
of the investor base supported less than 4 projects), frequent
ones (11% supported more than 32 projects) tend to fund ef-
forts that are well-managed and match their own interests.
By contrast, occasional investors pay less attention to any of
those aspects and thus act as donors, mainly on art-related
projects.
• Upon the quantitative analysis, we build a statistical model to
recommend potential investors from Twitter (Section 6). Our
model achieves 84% of accuracy in predicting an unordered
list of investors, and an average percentile-ranking of 0.32
(i.e., a 36% gain over the random baseline) in predicting an
ordered list. Also, in situations of investor cold start (no pre-
vious information about an investor is available), we are still
able to predict who funds what with an accuracy of 69% from
Twitter-derived activity features, and an average percentile-
ranking of 0.40 (20% gain over the random baseline).
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We conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implica-
tions of our findings (Section 7).
2. RELATED WORK
The first crowdfunding site started in 2001 and now there are more
than 450 of such sites. They together have raised $2.8 billion and
successfully funded more than 1 million projects only in 2012 [17].
Kickstarter is the largest site in USA. In it, a founder proposes a
project by posting information about the project’s purposes, mon-
etary goals, time left to reach those goals, the way funds will be
used, and potential rewards (e.g., the founder might offer a signed
CD in exchange of a donation). To increase his/her likelihood of
success, the founder usually posts videos and pictures to visually
explain the project. (S)he also connects the project’s page to dedi-
cated social-networking accounts [18]. As crowdfunding sites have
emerged, small entrepreneurs without an access to traditional ven-
ture capital’s fundings have benefited from this new source of cash
flow.
Crowdfunding has recently attracted the attention of researchers
in various disciplines, from business and economics to computer
science. Economists have investigated pleading behavior and they,
for example, found that crowdfunding eliminates distance-related
economic frictions, yet initial findings tend often to come from
family, friends and acquaintances [1].
Most of the work by computer scientists has focused, instead,
on predicting whether projects will be successfully funded or not.
Mollick found that variables under two categories - preparedness
(e.g., existence of video, spelling check, number of updates) and
social capital (e.g., number of the founder’s Facebook friends) -
are strongly related to the success of a project [18]. Greenberg et
al. found that SVM could predict, at the time of launch, whether a
project will fail or succeed with a roughly 68% accuracy [12]. More
recently, based only on the use of language in project descriptions,
Gilbert et al. were able to predict failure or success - they indeed
found that there are specific phrases that are powerful predictors
of success [11]. These phrases are mainly related to six general
persuasion principles: 1) reciprocity, 2) scarcity, 3) social proof, 4)
social identity, 5) liking, and 6) authority. After launch, one could
also track features that change as the project evolves. In this vein,
upon the time series of money pledged and tweets, Etter et al. were
able to predict success/failure with an accuracy of 85% at early
stages - that is, just after 15% of the entire duration of a campaign
has passed [9].
Hui et al. conducted a throughout qualitative analysis based on
45 interviews and found that the work behind setting up a crowd-
funding project unfolds in five main steps: 1) prepare; 2) test; 3)
publicize; 4) follow through; and 5) contribute. They then went on
recommending which tools computer scientists could build for sup-
porting each of the steps [14]. The most difficult step was identified
to be the third one: founders repeatedly failed to build a community
and attract potential investors: “The majority of failed project cre-
ators cited the inability to successfully leverage an online audience
as a main reason for failing.” [14]
Based on this literature review, we might conclude that an auto-
matic way of matching projects with investors is needed. To pro-
pose such a way, we carry out an analysis that unfolds in three
steps: derive few hypotheses concerning pledging behavior; 2) col-
lect data from Kickstarter and Twitter to test those hypotheses; and
3) based on the findings, propose and evaluate models that match
projects with potential investors.
3. INVESTORS VS. DONORS
Pledging behavior might well differ from one investor to another.
It has been found that 20-40% of initial fundings in Kickstarter
come from family and friends [8]. These individuals tend to be
newcomers or occasional investors who support projects because
of their personal relationships with the founders. By contrast, users
who are very active in Kickstarter are passionate about the commu-
nity and fund a project for different reasons. To test the extent to
which this distinction impacts pledging behavior, we differentiate
investors depending on whether they are occasional (they have sup-
ported, say, less than 4 projects) or frequent (they have supported
more than 32 projects), and formulate a set of hypotheses, which
Table 1 collates for convenience. We expect that the more active a
supporter has been, the more (s)he will behave as an investor, and
the less as a friend donating money. More specifically, as opposed
to occasional investors, frequent ones are expected to:
Pay Attention to Founder Skills. Successful venture founders are
good managers as well: “Many entrepreneurs make the mistake of
thinking that venture capitalists are looking for good ideas when, in
fact, they are looking for good mangers in particular industry seg-
ments.” [24] We expect that frequent investors will pay attention to
the way a project is managed. Since management of a Kickstarter
project translates into frequent updates after launch and audience
interactions, our first hypothesis is: [H1] A project is likely to be
financed by frequent investors if its founder: [H1.1] frequently up-
dates the project after launching it (i.e., (s)he spends extra effort
to make it happen [19]); [H1.2] answers the potential investors’
requests (i.e., she interacts with the audience); [H1.3] allows for
fine-grained funding levels; and [H1.4] sets a dedicated web site.
Invest in “High Capital” Projects. Since Kickstarter follows “all-
or-nothing” model (i.e., projects that do not reach their pledging
goals do not receive a penny), founders tend to set realistic goals
for the amount to be raised. It is reasonable to assume that projects
with high goals are ambitious (e.g., bringing a new video game to
market) and thus tend to be preferentially financed by frequent and
experienced investors [21]: [H2] A project with a high goal is likely
to be financed by frequent investors.
Invest in Geographically Global Projects. Since friends and ac-
quaintances tend to be geographically close, we expect that those
who support (geographically) local projects are occasional investors,
while frequent ones would also support global projects [1]. We de-
fine the geographic dispersion of project p as:
Gp =
1
Np
∑
b∈Bp
D(lf , lb) (1)
which measures the mean distance for all pledges of a project (dis-
tance between a project p and an investor b). In Kickstarter, founders
and investors tend to reveal their location in terms of city. We thus
convert city names into geographic coordinates of the correspond-
ing centroids (latitude and longitude) and measure the Harvesine
distance D between the founder’s location (lf ) and each investor’s
location (lb). Np is number of all investors for project p. With this
definition, low geographic dispersion is associated with projects
with investors who live close to the founder, while high dispersion
is associated with investors who live far away. The corresponding
hypothesis then reads: [H3] A local project is likely to be supported
by occasional investors.
Pay Attention to Fast Growing Projects. As opposed to occa-
sional investors, frequent ones are familiar with the site and are
Hypothesis
[H1] A project is likely to be financed by frequent investors if its founder:
[H1.1] frequently updates the project after launching it.
[H1.2] answers the potential investors’ requests.
[H1.3] allows for fine-grained funding levels.
[H1.4] sets a dedicated web site.
[H2] A project with a high goal is likely to be financed by frequent investors.
[H3] A local project is likely to be supported by occasional investors.
[H4] A fast-growing project is likely to be financed by frequent investors.
[H5] Active investors tend to fund projects that match their own interests.
Table 1: List of Hypotheses in this Study.
comics
design
fashiontheater
publishing
dance
photography
film
food
games
music
art
technology
Category
# 
of
 p
ro
je
ct
s
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Figure 2: Frequency distribution for each category.
thus expected to be able to quickly spot fast-growing opportuni-
ties [21, 22]: [H4] A fast-growing project is likely to be financed by
frequent investors.
Invest in Project Categories of Interest. When deciding whether
to fund a project or not, frequent investors might well be looking for
projects that match their own interests, while occasional investors
do not concern that as they, for example, tend to support a friend.
[H5] Active investors tend to fund projects that match their own
interests. To capture each investor’s interests, we keep track of: 1)
which project categories (s)he supports, and 2) the topics classified
using LDA topic modeling [4, 13, 23] (s)he mentions on Twitter.
4. DATASET
Since Kickstarter is not accessible from an API, we need to build
a crawler running on University servers on which we run our data
analysis as well. We gather all the projects featured on the Re-
cently Launched1 Kickstarter page between July 2013 and Octo-
ber 2013. Once a new campaign is identified, we crawl its cat-
egory (e.g., Film, Dance, Art, Design and Technology), funding
goal, and deadline. We then regularly check each project’s page for
any change in the amount of pledged money and total number of
investors. To have a comparable dataset of projects, we have elimi-
nated 345 Kickstarter projects that happened to be outside USA. In
so doing, we have collected information about 1,149 projects that
were funded by 78,460 investors with a total number of 177,882
pledges. These projects are classified in 13 categories, and the most
popular ones are Film, Music, Publishing, and Art (Figure 2).
During the same period of time, we collected all tweets2 contain-
ing the keyword “kickstarter” from the publicly available Twitter
search API. If a tweet matches one of our Kickstarter projects (if a
tweet contains project title or shortened url directing to the project
1http://www.kickstarter.com/discover/
recently-launched
2A server located at Computer Laboratory, University of Cam-
bridge was used to collect Twitter data.
Successful Failed Total
Projects 520 629 1,149
Proportion 45.3% 54.7% 100%
Investors - - 78,460
Pledges 148,257 29,625 177,882
Pledged ($) 10,517,919 1,872,741 12,390,660
Tweets 49,943 21,372 71,315
Table 2: Statistics for the Kickstarter dataset.
Successful Failed Total
Goal ($) 11,033.90 30,716.86 20,875.38
Duration (days) 28.56 29.25 28.91
Number of investors 285.11 47.09 166.10
Pledge ($) 79.71 60.13 68.99
Final amount 168.93% 19.51% 94.22%
Number of tweets 101.93 44.43 73.18
Table 3: Statistics for the Kickstarter projects. All reported are
the average of each measure for Kickstarter projects.
page), we match the tweet’s content with the project, resulting in a
total of 71,315 tweets.
Table 2 reports general statistics of our Kickstarter dataset, and
Table 3 reports statistics specifically about the projects. The num-
bers in Table 3 are the average of all projects. Out of our 1,149
projects, $12.3M were pledged and 520 projects (45.2%) were suc-
cessfully funded (i.e., they met their pledging goals). This suc-
cess rate is similar to the general one published by Kickstarter it-
self3: 43.85%. On average, as opposed to unsuccessful projects, the
ones that are successfully funded tend to have lower financial goals
($11,033 vs. $30,716); have more investors (285 vs. 47), raise more
funds than their goals would require (169% vs. 19%), and generate
more tweets (101 vs. 44) (Table 3). In our dataset, 85% of dona-
tions get into successful projects (this is 86% in Kickstarter). The
average duration of a successful campaign is 28.9 days; however,
it takes just few days (13 days) to be fully financed. On the other
hand, unsuccessful campaigns, which are 54.8%, take just 19.5% of
the required investment (this was 20% by Kickstarter in 2012 [6]).
Since the previous statistics in our dataset match those in the larger
sample, we conclude that our dataset is fairly representative.
People who back a project for the first time often go on to back
other projects. Among 78,460 people who have backed one of
projects in our dataset, 22K (28%) people have backed two or more
projects (Kickstarter has reported 29% of all backers as repeat back-
ers). On average, investors in our dataset supported three projects.
3http://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats. All
statistics reported are retrieved on 3rd November 2013.
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Figure 3: Distribution of investor activity levels. These levels
are quantified using the number of projects supported by each
investor.
Min Max Mean Distribution
#updates 0 42 3.5
#comments 0 7298 22
Reward level 1 52 10
Web site
Goal ($) 47 3M 22K
Geographic dispersion 0 76 12
Growth rate 0 1.7 0.4
Table 4: Our predictive features: minimum, maximum, mean,
and frequency distributions (a-h). The x-axis reports the values
of each feature (which is log-transformed if skewed), and the y-
axis reports the number of users.
We segment them into two groups - occasional investors who funded
less than 4 projects (51%), and frequent ones who funded more
than 32 projects (11%). Figure 3 displays the frequency distribu-
tion of their activity levels. We also display distribution of each
project feature in Table 4. Since the distributions of the features
are skewed, we shown their log-transformed distributions if it is
necessary.
5. PLEDGING BEHAVIOR
Having this dataset at hand, we are now able to quantitatively ana-
lyze investors’ pledging behavior. To do so, we will often resort to
the probability that a investor of type B (e.g., occasional) will fund
a project of type P (e.g., projects of smart watches):
p(B|P ) = p(B ∩ P )
p(P )
(2)
We compute this probability by counting the fraction of investors
of type B who funded projects of type P (e.g., occasional investors
who funded projects of smart watches) out of all investors who
backed projects of type P (e.g., investors of any type who funded
projects of smart watches). When testing our hypotheses, we will
compute the probability of funding a project P for different in-
vestor types, and type is defined depending on the level of pledging
activity: from occasional investors who supported less than four
projects, to investors who supported less than 8, up to frequent
investors who supported more than 32. One of the probabilities
p(B|P ) could then be p(occasional|P ), which is the probability
of an occasional investor to fund project P . After clarifying our
notation, we are now ready to test each of the main five hypotheses
one by one.
[H1] A project is likely to be financed by frequent investors if the
project founder:
[H1.1] frequently updates the project after launching it;
[H1.2] answers the potential investors’ requests;
[H1.3] allows for fine-grained funding levels;
[H1.4] sets a dedicated web site.
We find that frequent investors are more likely to pledge projects
with frequent updates (Figure 4(a)) and higher level of founder en-
gagement (number of comments) (Figure 4(b)). As the number
of comments increases by an order of 2, the pledging probabil-
ity increases by 10%. Funding levels (Figure 4(c)) and dedicated
web sites do matter, but to a lesser extent compared to the previ-
ous two features. We also compute the Pearson’s correlation co-
efficients between a management strategy and investor’s activity
levels. These coefficients range from -1 (strongest negative corre-
lation) to 1 (strongest positive correlation), and are 0 when there is
no correlation. Frequent investors seem to decide whether to fund
a project or not depending on the number of updates done by the
founder (r = 0.26, p < 0.05) and on the number of comments the
project has received (r = 0.19, p < 0.05). The presence of differ-
ent reward levels (r = 0.05, p < 0.05) and of a dedicated web site
(r = 0.10, p < 0.05) are considered by occasional and frequent
investors alike. Overall, the first hypothesis is supported.
[H2] A project with high pledging goal is likely to be financed by
frequent investors.
By dividing projects into 5 categories depending on their plead-
ing goals, we find that, the higher a project’s goal, the less likely
occasional investors support it. By contrast, frequent investors are
more likely to fund high-goal projects (Figure 4(d)). The correla-
tion between investor activity and the pledging goals of supported
projects is indeed positive: r = 0.21, p < 0.05. Hence the sec-
ond hypothesis is also confirmed. From the perspective of a rec-
ommender system that matches investors with projects, this result
suggests that high-goal projects should be preferentially matched
with frequent investors.
[H3] A local project is likely to be financed by occasional investors.
As we mentioned in Section 3, we compute the average geo-
graphic span of a project’s investors to measure the extent to which
a project attracts local vs. global fundings. We then plot the pledg-
ing probability as a function of geographic span (Figure 4(e)) and
find that occasional investors largely fund projects with low ge-
ographic span (i.e., local projects), while frequent investors fund
projects with high span. The correlation coefficient between in-
vestor activity and geographic span is r = 0.32, p < 0.05, and
that supports the third hypothesis. For a recommender system, this
result means that local projects should be matched with local Kick-
starter users who tend to be occasional investors.
[H4] A fast-growing project is likely to be financed by frequent in-
vestors.
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Figure 4: Probability of investor B to fund project P , as a function of (a) the number of updates made by the project’s founder; (b)
the number of comments received by the project; (c) the rewards levels made available to investors; (d) the project’s pledging goal;
(e) the investors’ geographic span; and (f) the project’s growth rate.
We confirm this hypothesis as well since we find that frequent
investors tend to indeed support high-growth projects (Figure 4(f)).
By contrast, occasional investors do not select the projects to sup-
port depending on growth rate - they just happen to support the
majority of projects that are characterized by limited growth. The
correlation between investor activity and project growth is positive
and is r = 0.17, p < 0.05.
[H5] Frequent investors tend to support projects that match their
own interests.
To test this hypothesis, we consider investors who are on Twitter
and crawl 200 tweets (at most) for each of them using the Twitter
Public API. To compute the topical similarity between a project’s
description and an investor’s tweets, we run the topic model La-
tent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) on the tweets and the project de-
scriptions. As a result, each project is represented by a topic vec-
tor, and each investor’s Twitter account is represented by another
topic vector. To assess whether a project’s description matches an
investor’s interests, we simply compute the cosine similarity be-
tween the project’s topical vector and the investor’s. We do so for
all project-investor pairs and find that frequent investors do indeed
support projects that match their own interests, while occasional
investors’ topical interests are not really matching to projects they
supported. We also find that frequent investors fund projects in
a variety of categories, while occasional ones tend to stick with
the same category, if they happen to fund more than one project.
The correlation between investor activity and project-investor co-
sine similarity is positive: r = 0.20, p < 0.05. In practice, this
suggests that topical matching between projects and investors tends
to work better for frequent investors than for occasional ones.
5.1 Summary
We find that frequent investors are likely to fund projects that are
well-managed; have high pledging goals; are global; grow quickly;
and match their interests. Occasional investors, instead, do not
seem to base their decisions on those aspects. We might thus infer
that those who have supported a considerable number of projects
act in ways similar to how investors would do, while occasional
supporters appear to be behaving as charitable donors. As hinted
by a news article [8], we suspect that occasional investors are lured
into Kickstarter by their own friends and family members who
might happen to be on Facebook. We thus expect that, to be suc-
cessful, projects funded by occasional investors should be char-
acterized by a considerable number of Facebook friends. To see
whether this is the case, we plot the probability that an investor sup-
ports a project as a function of the number of the project founder’s
Facebook friends (Figure 5), and indeed find that projects whose
founders have many Facebook friends tend to attract occasional in-
vestors, while founders with moderate numbers of Facebook friends
attract frequent investors, partly confirming our expectation.
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Figure 5: Probability that investorB funds project P as a func-
tion of the number of the project founder’s Facebook friends.
6. RECOMMENDING INVESTORS
Based on the previous results, we are now able to recommend po-
tential investors for a specific project. We do so by using logistic
regression (LR) and Support Vector Machine (SVM). We use three
different SVM kernels: linear, polynomial, and RBF (Radial Ba-
sis Function). The latter is more flexible and general than the first
two as it copes with situations in which the relationships between
features are non-linear.
To recommend potential investors who are on Twitter, we need
to link Kickstarter users to their Twitter accounts first. We do so
by matching the names of Kickstarter users interested in a project
with Twitter users mentioning the project. In so doing, we end up
with 7,429 investors who are on Twitter, and with 891 projects they
had funded. To preliminarily test the accuracy of such matching,
we randomly select 200 matching and manually inspect them: the
resulting accuracy is 92%.
6.1 Experimental Setup
We initially formulate the task of predicting who funds what as
a binary classification problem. For each project-investor pair, we
predict whether the investor supports the project (prediction is 1) or
not (prediction is 0). That translates into having, for each project,
an unordered list of Twitter users who are likely to fund it.
We run those predictions on input of features that are both static
and dynamic. Static features are permanently set at the start of the
campaign and include a project’s pledging goal, reward level, and
category. They also include an investor’s past supported project
categories and his/her interests expressed on Twitter. Dynamic fea-
tures, instead, change as the campaign unfolds and include pledge
growth rate, number of project updates, geographic dispersion of
investors, and the number of comments exchanged between the
founder and the community.
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#Comments 0.67 ∗
Reward level 0.12 0.03
Goal 0.60 ∗ 0.85 ∗ 0.19
Growth rate 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.11
Geo-D 0.12 0.21 0.16 0.23 0.13
Activity level 0.26 0.19 0.05 0.21 0.32 0.17
Table 5: Pearson correlation coefficients between each pair of
features. Coefficients greater than ±0.5 with statistical signifi-
cant level < 0.05 are marked with a ∗.
Model Features ACC P R F1 AUC
LR Static 0.57 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.57
Dynamic 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.57
SVM-linear Static 0.58 0.60 0.51 0.55 0.58
Dynamic 0.58 0.60 0.50 0.55 0.58
SVM-poly Static 0.80 0.81 0.75 0.79 0.80
Dynamic 0.68 0.76 0.54 0.63 0.68
SVM-RBF Static 0.82 0.79 0.83 0.82 0.81
Dynamic 0.73 0.75 0.68 0.71 0.73
Table 6: Prediction results with the balanced test dataset (50/50
split).
Since our data only includes positive cases – that is, the set of
pledges that actually happened – we need to augment our dataset
with negative cases (by under-sampling them): we do so by adding
an equal number of negative cases – that is, with a set of random
project-investor pairs. By construction, the resulting sample is bal-
anced (the response variable is split 50-50), and the accuracy of a
random prediction model would thus be 50%.
To evaluate the performance of the logistic regression and SVM
without running into the problem of over-fitting, we perform 5-fold
cross validation. That is, we randomly split the projects into two
subsets: the first contains 80% of the projects and is used for train-
ing; the second set contains 20% of the projects and is used for
testing. We repeat this split for 5 rounds and average the perfor-
mance results across those rounds.
As evaluation metrics, we resort to those that are widely-used
in classification problems: Accuracy (ACC), Precision, Recall, F-
score, and Area Under the receiver-operator characteristic Curve
(AUC).
6.2 Experimental Results
Before training any of the models, we compute the (Pearson) cor-
relation coefficient between each pair of project features (Table 5).
We find that few features are correlated with each other (i.e., there
are high positive correlations (where r > 0.50) between the pledg-
ing goal, the number of updates and the number of comments).
Since it is not useful to simultaneously use all the features in the
classification task, the input for the LR will include only the fea-
tures that are not strongly correlated with each other (i.e., we only
include the number of comments among those three features).
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Figure 6: Model trained with different subsets of features
Prediction with balanced dataset. Table 6 shows the results for
our prediction models for balanced dataset on input of both static
and dynamic features. We find that SVM with polynomial and RBF
kernels work best, suggesting that our data points are not linearly
separated in the hyperplane. Interestingly, on input of static fea-
tures, the best classifier achieves 82% accuracy (ACC); on input of
dynamic features, the accuracy slightly degrades (73%); while, as
one expects, on input of both types of feature, the accuracy slightly
increases to 84%.
These predictions are done upon the complete set of uncorrelated
features. However, to know which feature individually matters and
which does not, we re-run our classifications on input of differ-
ent combinations of the following features: number of comments
(C), reward levels (R), geographic span (S), growth rate (G), cat-
egory matching (E) and topic similarity (TS). Again, we exclude
two features: pledging goal and number of updates as they are both
strongly correlated with the number of comments. Figure 6 shows
the corresponding prediction accuracies: all features individually
help to predict pledging behavior, but adding category matching
and topical similarity results in considerable performance improve-
ments. We can then confirm that by visual inspection of Figure 7.
This plots the probability that an investor with a given level of ac-
tivity funds a project in a given category. We see that occasional
investors (red bar segments) support music projects, while active
investors (purple bar segments) support projects with high pledg-
ing goals in, say, the gaming industry.
Prediction with imbalanced dataset. Our evaluation has so far
assumed a 50-50 split between positive and negative cases. As this
might not always be the case, we create an alternative test set with
a 20/80 split (positive/negative): we train our models still on the
balanced set but test them on the newly created unbalanced test
set. We find that the results are similar to those obtained before
(Table 7), yet with a minor degrade in precision. However, the
accuracy (ACC) still remains as high as 82%.
6.3 Ranking investors
To go beyond binary classifications, we now set out to rank in-
vestors. So the problem is now, given a project, to return a ranked
list of investors.
As evaluation metrics, we resort to two measures widely-used in
ranking problems: MeanRR (Mean Reciprocal Rank) and MaxRR
(Maximum Reciprocal Rank). We denote ranki,p the percentile-
ranking of investor i within the ordered list of investors predicted
for project P : ranki,P = 0% if investor i is predicted to be the
Model Features ACC AUC
LR Static 0.56 0.57
Dynamic 0.57 0.57
SVM-linear Static 0.60 0.58
Dynamic 0.61 0.59
SVM-poly Static 0.81 0.80
Dynamic 0.77 0.70
SVM-RBF Static 0.82 0.81
Dynamic 0.74 0.73
Table 7: Prediction results with the imbalanced test set (20/80
split).
Model Features MeanRR MaxRR
Random - 0.50 0.87
SVM-RBF Static 0.34 0.39
Dynamic 0.37 0.40
All 0.32 0.38
Table 8: Ranking Results.
most desirable for project P . Starting from this definition of rank,
we can then formulate the total average percentile-ranking as:
rank =
∑
i,P
fundedi,P ˙ranki,P∑
i,P
ranki,P
(3)
where fundedi,P is a flag that reflects whether investor i has sup-
ported project P : it is 0, if i did not support it; otherwise, it is
1. The lower a list’s rank, the better the list’s quality. For ran-
dom predictions, the expected value for rank is 0.5. Therefore,
a rank < 0.5 is associated with an algorithm better than random.
Given a ranked list, MeanRR returns the average rank score for
the “correct” investors (i.e., investors who actually supported the
project), while MaxRR returns the score of the highest ranked cor-
rect investor (i.e., highest ranked among the investors who actually
supported the project). The lower these two metrics, the better the
ranking.
To ranking investors, we opt for the model that previously showed
the best performance: SVM with RBF kernel. This model returns
the probability of the outcome to be “1” (i.e., the probability that
an investor B will support a project P ). Upon our test set, for each
project, we sort all users (a union set of training and test sets, which
is the total number of 7,429 Twitter users) by this probability and
recommend those who score the highest. In this way, it is similar to
content-based recommendation. Table 10 compares SVM’s rank-
ing accuracy with random model’s. We can see that based only on
static features, we can achieve percentile ranking of 0.34, which is
lower than random model.
7. DISCUSSION
We now discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our
work.
7.1 Theoretical Implications
There is a debate about the motives of crowdfunding investors. Ini-
tially, they were seen as donors [15, 20]: “Some crowdfunding ef-
forts, such as art or humanitarian projects, view their funders as
patrons or philanthropists, who expect nothing in return.” [3]. In
the same vein, Gerber et al. listed the following motivations for in-
vestors: seek (non-financial) rewards, support creators and causes,
engage and contribute to a trusting and creative community [10].
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Figure 7: Probability that investor B (with a given level of activity) funds project P across different project categories.
More recently however, crowdfunding sites have been increasingly
attracting a variety of founders: from small entrepreneurs who tra-
ditionally relied on the 3Fs (friends, family, and fools [2]) to big
companies that now use those sites as marketing tools. In line
with these changes over the years, we have found that investors
also tend to be of different types: pledging behavior of frequent in-
vestors is very different from that of occasional ones. The former
act as proper investors, while the latter act as donors. They gener-
ally support different projects: art projects (e.g., music, dance) are
largely funded by occasional investors, while projects on technol-
ogy, games, and comics are funded by frequent ones. This suggests
that pledging campaigns need to identify the right target investors
to be successful. Artistic projects should rely on the traditional 3Fs
(friends, family, and fools), perhaps employing social media sites
to efficiently reach them. By contrast, technology projects should
broaden their search and look for active and frequent investors.
7.2 Practical Implications
The good news is that we have shown that it is possible to iden-
tify and recommend frequent investors. However, it might not be
sustainable to simply recommend investors only out of Kickstarter
users: such an investor pool would limited and we could conse-
quently end up recommending the same investors over and over
again. To see whether we could expand the investor pool, it might
be beneficial to study whether we could match unknown investors
(who are not on Kickstarter but only on Twitter) with projects to be
funded. To this end, we combine both static and dynamic project
features (Section 6.1) with Twitter-derived features to test whether
we can predict potential investors for each project. The Twitter-
derived features are widely-used to measure activity, status [16],
and influence [5], and they are three: 1) the logarithm of the total
number of tweets (activity); 2) the logarithm of the total number of
followers divided by the number of followees (status); and 3) the
sum of the average number of retweets, favorites, and mentions of
the account’s tweets (influence).
Using cross validation on our data in a way similar to what we
have already done in Section 6.1, we train the SVM-RBF model,
which previously showed the best performance, solely on project
and Twitter-derived features. We learn that this model achieves
68% of accuracy (ACC in Table 9) and an average percentile rank-
ing of 0.4 (Table 10), making it partly possible to recommend in-
vestors in cold-start situations and, as such, considerably expanding
the investor pool.
8. CONCLUSION
Model Features ACC P R F1 AUC
SVM-RBF Static 0.68 0.71 0.61 0.66 0.68
Dynamic 0.67 0.72 0.58 0.64 0.67
Table 9: Prediction results for Twitter+Project features.
model Features MeanRR MaxRR
Random - 0.50 0.87
SVM-RBF Static 0.44 0.47
Dynamic 0.44 0.46
All 0.40 0.41
Table 10: Ranking results for Twitter+Project features.
Everyday there are on average 39 new projects in Kickstarter: not
only artists or entrepreneurs are profiting from this new way of rais-
ing funds, but also city councils and political organizations have
joined the fray. This is the first study to characterize the pledging
behavior of micro-funders. We have established that investors be-
have quite differently depending on whether they are very active
in the community or not. Frequent investors are attracted by am-
bitious projects, yet they carefully diversify their investment port-
folios. By contrast, occasional investors act as donors, mainly in
art-related projects.
We have also shown that it is possible to match new projects with
willing investors, and that is extremely important, not least because
the most common reason for failure in Kickstarter is the inability
of founders to reach out to the right investors.
We are currently working on a website that, on input of a Kick-
starter project’s url, will recommend a list of potential investors’
Twitter accounts. We will then test the extent to which Kickstarter
founders find this application useful. As for additional analysis, we
are planning to look at exogenous factors, as this study has focused
mainly on endogenous ones.
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